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1 Introduction
One of the most attractive properties of client-
initiated pull-based communication is that the con-
sumer of the content – the one who the bits are des-
tined for and the one who pays for their arrival – is in
control of what is being sent at all times. To stop wast-
ing time or money on the content, the user simply has
to stop asking for it. Even when the user is away from
the computer, only the data specifically requested (e.g.
via a file sharing application) are downloaded.
Push-based communication, on the other hand, is
inherently driven by the content producer. While push-
ing expedites delivery, it shifts to the producer the con-
trol over what data are sent and when. When this con-
trol is abused – as happens in any sufficiently large sys-
tem – recipients of theunwantedcontent waste time
and money. Spam and DoS attacks can be viewed as
manifestations of this problem, in the sense that they
both produce unwanted traffic by exploiting vulnera-
bilities in the design of underlying protocols. It is only
prudent to ask how the new push-based paradigm –
publish/subscribe messaging – fares in respect to these
dangers. So far, researchers mainly focused on total
access control to the messaging system [1, 2, 3, 4, 5].
While many useful solutions have been proposed, their
viability in a global, Internet-scale system is uncertain
at best, owing to the difficulties of deploying a global
public-key infrastructure.
One additional problem, perhaps uniquely impor-
tant in the pub/sub domain, appears to have been over-
looked so far. Namely, the problem of users not “keep-
ing up” with the incoming events. When we subscribe
to more magazines than we have time for, some of
them end up thrown away unread, even though we
wanted them. While this practice is tolerated with
physical and electronic mail, the widespread adoption
of pub/sub messaging has the potential to escalate the
amount of thisvain traffic to unacceptable proportions.
Events from content filters are of particular concern,
since their arrival rate is in theory bounded only by the
narrowness of the query. (The word “the” is in nearly
every page indexed by Google, so presumably sub-
scribing to new pages with this word would in theory
return almost every new page on the Internet!) Even if
client software can hide outdated events from the user
and sanity checks can prevent “the”-queries, overall
network utilization, especially in the vicinity of sub-
scribers, has much to gain from a system-wide mech-
anism for minimizing vain traffic.
The main purpose of this paper is to illuminate two
types of unwanted traffic in a pub/sub system – ma-
licious (spam, DoS attacks) and vain – and suggest a
general mechanism for minimizing their effects. We
do this by augmenting the classic pub/sub interface
with volume-limiting parameters – a combination of
attributes assigned to events by publishers and thresh-
olds specified by subscribers – and consider the im-
plications of this interface on the unwanted traffic and
on the routing infrastructure. Notably, we observe that
this mechanism can minimize unwanted trafficwith-
out total access control if the routing substrate supports
two properties: flow control and routing integrity.
We do not claim to have found the silver bullet for
spam or an overflowing mailbox after a vacation, but
wedoclaim that if unwanted traffic is not considered at
the early design stages of large-scale pub/sub systems,
we may never get the chance to fix them later.
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2 Design Principles
This section presents the key principles behind our
solution, based on our observations of global-scale
systems of today:
Beware of cryptography. Throwing public-key
cryptography at a problem is all too often the knee-
jerk reaction of both researchers and developers of dis-
tributed systems in which malicious participants may
be involved. Sender authentication has been touted
as the panacea for email spam and approaches that
rely on a public-key infrastructure are now infiltrating
many pub/sub research projects. While we believe that
asymmetric cryptography has important roles to play
in pub/sub systems – for example, in securing commu-
nication between subscribers and local event brokers
or between subscribers and publishers – we are skepti-
cal regarding the feasibility of a global-scale PKI. The
challenges of deploying one, which nobody has ex-
plicitly surmounted to date in practice or in theory, in-
clude efficient handling of certificate revocations in the
face of arbitrary failures and designing a theoretically-
sound and cost-effective procedure for mitigating the
effects of security breaches.
Beware of routing complexity.Although power-
ful and appropriate for many distributed applications,
content-based pub/sub systems are arguably too com-
plex for deployment as a global one-to-many messag-
ing substrate. Expressive power comes at a cost in
scalability, so if a less expressive subscription scheme
is sufficient for most applications – and we believe it is
– then that simpler scheme is ultimately more viable.
Furthermore, it is not clear how to protect a global
content-based messaging system from abuse.
Beware of pushers.One of the key advantages of a
push-based data broadcast mechanism is that the bytes
are replicated on the way to the endpoints “for free.”
This is also its greatest danger, since it hides from the
publisher the total cost of delivering the data to sub-
scribers, which in turn shields the publisher from re-
sponsibility for content and encourages abuse. Of all
properties of push-based mechanisms,timelinessis the
only one that cannot be achieved with a pull (without
incurring inordinate amount of overhead). This moti-
vated our decision to use push only for event notifica-
tion delivery, but not for event content distribution.
3 Architecture
The architecture that has emerged from these prin-
ciples is that of a topic-based system with no global
access control and a combination of push and pull for
content distribution. Essentially, after connecting to
one or more of the event brokers, any user can sub-
scribe to a topic or advertise a new one. The sys-
tem ensures that events published on the topic reach
its subscribers (although, as with other such systems,
to get strong delivery guarantees, a higher-level proto-
col would be necessary). The notifications carry meta-
data, but not the content. The content is pulled by the
subscriber directly from the publisher, using the ad-
dress included in the meta-data.
Upon the pull, the publisher and the subscriber may
chose to authenticate each other via some out-of-band
mechanism, such as the ubiquitous login-over-SSL
method used by many web publishers today (in which
only publishers are authenticated via the PKI), but that
is purely optional. Publishers would authenticate to re-
strict their subscriber base and subscribers would au-
thenticate if they are concerned about forged publica-
tions. Notably, upon authenticating a publisher at a
particular IP address, further content pulled from that
IP does not require signatures to be deemed authentic.
Putting the publisher in control of content delivery has
two fundamental and interdependent implications:
• The content does not have to enter the sub-
scriber’s host until the subscriber choses to pro-
cess the notifications. Thus, if events become ir-
relevant before then – either because they expire
or they are deemed malicious (both cases will be
explained below) – they disappear without a byte
wasted on transmission of content. This trans-
lates into savings of bandwidth on the links near
the subscriber.
• We forfeit the ability of the routing substrate to
replicate data as the publication travels towards
the leaves of the broadcast tree. As a result, the
links near the publisher and the publisher itself
see considerably more traffic (in the form of pull
requests) than in a pure push-based scheme. We
argue that keeping the publisher “financially re-
sponsible” for the content is a good idea. Having
said that, by caching content or distributing it via
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swarming, the load on the publisher can be con-
siderably reduced.
Essentially, when only a portion of notifications
causes content pulls, our design relieves the subscriber
of some message load and adds to the load seen by the
publisher. For this to work, a mechanism to identify
irrelevant events is needed. It is presented next.
3.1 Volume limiting
Every system has a maximum rate at which it can
process input, and the receiving end of a pub/sub net-
work is no exception. That limit may be imposed by
hardware limitations, by a traffic quota from the ISP,
or by the user explicitly requesting a cap on the num-
ber of events presented (e.g. per day). When the arrival
rate exceeds that maximum rate, some events have to
be dropped sooner or later. To do better than random
dropping – after all not all events may be equally im-
portant – some way of prioritizing them is needed.
This is our motivation for allowing the publisher to
attach twovolume-limiting attributesto every notifi-
cation:
• Rank– Indication of an event’s importance in re-
lation to other events on the topic.
• Expiration – Time after which an event is no
longer relevant and should be discarded from the
queue.
Although publishers are not required to use these
two attributes and they cannot be forced to use them
correctly, it is in their interest to do so to ensure that
the most important events get through to the busiest
subscribers. For example, on the topic of weather up-
dates, attaching high priority to a storm warning and
ensuring timely expiration of old forecasts would give
an edge to the publisher utilizingRankandExpiration.
On the subscriber’s end,Expiration influences the
contents of the incoming queue andRank determines
the order of notifications in it. To limit the size of the
queue sensibly, our system offers two complementary
volume-limiting thresholdsto subscribers:
• Max – Accept at most this many highest-ranked
notifications at a time. This is aquantitativelimit.
• Threshold– Only notifications with the rank at or
above this threshold are deemed acceptable. This
is aqualitativelimit.
To illustrate, if one subscribed to a news topic, the
two limits used in concert would allow one to come
back from a month-long vacation and read the 30 most
important stories from the past month. Implications
of these limits on the routing infrastructure are consid-
ered in Section5. AlthoughRank is useful to most
publishers, it is indispensable for at least one type of
publisher: the indexer, described next.
3.2 Content-based filtering
Topics restrict a subscriber to the set of publishers
that contribute to them. To allow one to search for
events based on their content, regardless of a topic, our
system relies onindexers. Just as web crawlers index
the content of websites to allow others to find them,
an indexer parses all incoming events and notifies sub-
scribers whose queries match the content of the event.
To obtain events, the indexer can subscribe to other
topics and re-publish their content; also, it can open
an interface for anyone to submit their events to (not
unlike users notifying a crawler of a new web page).
Subscribers, for their part, submit out-of-band
queries to the indexer (in the query language of its
choice), which responds with the name of a cus-
tom topic that they should subscribe to. When the
first party is interested in a particular query, the in-
dexer creates a new topic, but otherwise the sub-
scribers are instructed to join an existing one. For
example, if I ask the indexer called Eoogle to no-
tify me when there are new events matching words
“weather” and “Norway,” then Eoogle may create a
new topic eoogle.query.norway.weather and sug-
gest that I subscribe to it. After doing so, I will receive
all events that match that query. Other subscribers with
an equivalent query will join that topic.
The volume-limiting thresholds are crucial for in-
dexer queries, which aggregate content from multiple
publishers and can effectuate an event arrival rate be-
yond the processing capacity of the subscriber. Web
indexers return results in small chunks, ordered by rel-
evance; thresholds can be viewed as the equivalent of
that mechanism for event queries.
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3.3 Feedback and ranking of content
Ranking of content, especially in the presence of
malicious publishers, is the crux of an indexer. Ex-
perience with web indexers shows that using feedback
from humans – in the form of links – is very effective
(although not fool proof). Lacking links, event index-
ers need other means of getting feedback from sub-
scribers. To that end, our system offers two feedback
channels:
• Re-publishing an articlecomes closest in spirit
to the idea of linking on the web. In our sys-
tem a notification may reference another notifica-
tion, allowing indexers to deduce the boost in the
popularity of the original. For example, a blog
post referenced by other blogs is an example of
re-publishing.
• Explicit feedbackfrom the user in the form of a
rating is the ultimate and most prompt indicator
of quality. As rating-enabled websites (e.g. Ama-
zon) illustrate, many people are willing to spend
the time to send feedback when they know it will
improve the quality of the result. The ability to
submit ratings is thus a feature of publisher’s API
in our system.
Publishers, including indexers, may use the feed-
back as they see fit. It could be used to adjust the rep-
utation of the content author (useful for for computing
ranks of future events) or it could be used to dynami-
cally change the rank of the article itself. In the latter
case, as the rank of the article changes, the publisher
may send updates to the previous notification.
To limit the effects of insincere feedback, both from
re-publishing and ratings, publishers may authenticate
contributors (even when they do not authenticate read-
ers) to keep track of their reputation. While there will
be, no doubt, plenty of opportunities for cheating – ei-
ther by defeating the authentication or by building up
reputation – the publishers have the incentive to keep
such problems to a minimum.
4 Malicious Traffic
We expect attempts from malicious parties to sub-
vert the system. Traffic that results from their exploits
is defined asmaliciousand falls into two broad cate-
gories distinguished by intended result:spamtries to
reach the eyes of subscribers not interested in it and a
DoS attacktries to slow down or disable the system or
a part of it.
4.1 Spam
Topic subscriptions are spam-proof in that unsub-
scribing is sufficient to silence a rogue publisher. Forg-
eries are weeded out when the publisher is authenti-
cated upon pulling content and thus never reach the
eyes of the subscriber. Spam can be a problem, how-
ever, when multiple parties publish on the same topic.
This can happen to a topic created by an indexer in re-
sponse to a query, or to a topic whose publisher accepts
out-of-band submissions from subscribers (this is how
a bulletin board can be built with our system). The so-
lution we envision relies on the same mechanisms that
we use to limit vain content:
First, Max and Thresholdensure that if the pub-
lisher is successful at assigning spam notifications a
lowerRank, the chances of users seeing it are reduced.
Second, even if the publisher is unsuccessful at iden-
tifying spam at first, by decoupling notification from
content delivery we increase the window of vulnerabil-
ity for spammers, so subscribers who notice the spam
early and submit negative feedback can prevent oth-
ers from pulling it (by causing the publisher to recom-
pute the rank for the event and send an update to sub-
scribers). Thus, volume limiting is a general technique
for minimizing unwanted traffic.
4.2 Denial of Service
Pub/sub systems share DoS vulnerabilities with
other network services and resolving those problems
is an open research area. Of bigger concern to design-
ers of pub/sub systems are the risks that the messag-
ing mechanism itself introduces. In the most general
sense, the question is whether a small subset of partic-
ipants (subscribers, publishers, or event brokers) can
use the pub/sub interface to overload or disrupt the op-
eration of the system. There are two approaches to
overloading, which an attacker may use:
• Insert frivolous data– such as well-formed publi-
cations, subscriptions, and advertisements – with-
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out the intention of using the system. We claim
that this type of behavior fundamentally cannot
be distinguished from legitimate behavior. As
such, it can be restricted only as part of regulating
all flows of data in the system.
• Insert forged data– i.e. publications or subscrip-
tions on behalf of someone else – directing un-
wanted traffic towards one or more victims. Pre-
venting this type of abuse requires some degree
of integrity from the routing substrate, namely the
ability to limit the propagation of messages with
spoofed IDs. (More on this below.)
5 Implications on routing
Introduction of volume-limiting parameters on the
edges of the network, which helps minimize vain and
spam traffic, also opens doors to optimizations inside
the pub/sub network. Consider the path travelled by
a notification from a publisher to a subscriber. In an
ideal setting, in which routing tables are unlimited
and routing operations are free, the volume-limiting
thresholds of the subscriber can be passed back along
the path all the way to the publisher. Hence, every
node in the broadcast tree can compute the maximal
Max and the minimalThresholdfor each branch be-
low. Unwanted traffic can then be minimized within
the network if every node only forwards notifications
so as to satisfy the thresholds of its children. This is
essentially a form of inter-nodeflow control that al-
lows downstream nodes to put backpressure on their
parents.
A realistic implementation of flow control would
not have the complete global state at its disposal.
Event brokers would have to rely on approximate in-
formation about downstream thresholds. Furthermore,
the effective forwarding rate may be subject to over-
all traffic restrictions established between individual
nodes: for example, a subscriber may be restricted
by a contract with the border event broker; similarly,
event brokers in different domains may have mutual
service agreements on cross-domain traffic, etc. Pre-
cise accounting can, in theory, even make insertion of
frivolous data, as described in the previous section, an
unprofitable enterprise. Essentially, those who pay a
fair price for bandwidth can do whatever they want
with it!
Unfortunately, forged data that is allowed to prop-
agate through the network can wreak havoc with flow
control and accounting. For example, forgedpubli-
cationswith high rank may “steal” room from legiti-
mate publications inside the window established by the
thresholds. With enough forgeries in the pipe, the sub-
scriber may not receive anything at all on a topic after
forgeries are filtered out by its client. Similarly, forged
subscriptionsmay use up the overall traffic quota that
the subscriber was granted by the border event bro-
ker. Therefore, the routing substrate needs machinery
to guaranteeintegrity of the forwarding paths, which
includes restricting propagation of forgeries.
6 Summary
To minimize unwanted traffic in a pub/sub system,
we advocate the use of volume-limiting parameters at
the edges and a combination of flow control and in-
tegrity in the routing mechanism. Although the system
we sketched out is topic-based, we believe our conclu-
sions hold for a wide range of pub/sub systems, with
different routing schemes. We hope that others will
join us in investigating this question.
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